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SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT STUN
GUNS
René Reyes*
Abstract
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) recently
declared that the Commonwealth’s statutory ban on stun guns
violates the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The
SJC had previously upheld the statute against constitutional
challenge in Commonwealth v. Caetano, but the reasoning behind
this holding was rejected in a brief per curium opinion by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2016. However, the guidance given by the
Supreme Court in the Caetano litigation was far from
unambiguous: it faulted the SJC’s reasoning without opining on
the ultimate question of the ban’s constitutionality, thus leaving
open the possibility that the statute could pass constitutional
muster under an alternative analytic approach. This essay
discusses what such an alternative approach might have looked
like. Specifically, I suggest that the SJC could have upheld the
statutory ban by emphasizing the relative rarity of stun guns as a
preferred means of self-defense not only as a matter of founding
era history, but also as a matter of contemporary reality. This sort
of analysis would have allowed the SJC to distinguish stun guns
from other weapons that have received constitutional protection in
other cases, and would have been fully consistent with both the
scope and limitations of the right to bear arms under the Supreme
Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence.

* Assistant Professor, Suffolk University Law School. J.D. Harvard Law
School, A.B. Harvard College.

450

SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT STUN GUNS

451

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 451
II. Second Amendment Doctrine:
Tensions and Ambiguities ………...... ......................................... 452
III. Resolving the Ambiguity: An Alternative Approach ............ 454
IV. Conclusion ............................................................................. 457

I. Introduction
In Ramirez v. Commonwealth,1 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (“SJC”) declared that the Commonwealth’s
statutory ban on stun guns violates the Second Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.2 The SJC had previously upheld the
statute against constitutional challenge in Commonwealth v.
Caetano,3 but the reasoning behind this holding was rejected by
the U.S. Supreme Court in a brief per curiam opinion in 2016.4
Notably, while the Supreme Court found that the SJC’s analysis
in Caetano I was inconsistent with constitutional principles, it
did not go so far as to hold the Massachusetts stun gun ban
unconstitutional; it merely vacated the Caetano I judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings.5 Nevertheless, the
SJC has interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance to mean that
“the absolute prohibition in section 131J that bars all civilians
from possessing or carrying stun guns, even in their home, is
inconsistent with the Second Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional.”6
Yet the SJC may have been too hasty in reaching this
conclusion. For the Supreme Court’s “guidance” in Caetano II was
1. 94 N.E.3d 809 (Mass. 2018) (striking down MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §
131J (2004) as facially invalid).
2. Id.
3. 26 N.E.3d 668 (Mass. 2015) (hereinafter “Caetano I”), vacated, Caetano
v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
4. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (hereinafter “Caetano
II”).
5. Id.
6. Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 815.

452

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 450 (2018)

far from unambiguous: it faulted the SJC’s reasoning without
opining on the ultimate question of constitutionality, thus leaving
open the possibility that section 131J could pass constitutional
muster under an alternative analytic approach. This essay
discusses what such an alternative approach might have looked
like and assesses how it might have fared. Specifically, I suggest
that the SJC could have upheld section 131J by emphasizing the
relative rarity of stun guns as a preferred means of self-defense
not only as a matter of founding era history but also as a matter
of contemporary reality. I argue that this sort of analysis would
have allowed the SJC to distinguish stun guns from other
weapons that have received constitutional protection in other
cases,7 and would have been fully consistent with both the scope
and limitations of the right to bear arms under the Supreme
Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence.
II. Second Amendment Doctrine: Tensions and Ambiguities
Beginning with United States v. Miller8 in 1939, federal
courts long took the view that the Second Amendment “protects
the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes,
but . . . does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the
nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”9 Indeed, until 2001,
“every Court of Appeals to consider the question had understood
Miller to hold that the Second Amendment does not protect the
right to possess and use guns for purely private, civilian
purposes.”10 But since District of Columbia v. Heller11 in 2008, the
7. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (concluding
that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms not
connected to service in militia, and striking down D.C.’s ban on possession of
handguns and requirement that other firearms be disassembled or bound by
trigger lock); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S 742 (2010) (determining that the
Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
and striking down municipal ban on private ownership of handguns).
8. 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to
conviction under the National Firearms Act for transporting short-barreled
shotgun in interstate commerce).
9. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 638 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Supreme Court has articulated a much more expansive
understanding of the right to bear arms. The Second Amendment
is no longer limited to militia service or to those weapons that are
useful in warfare; it is now interpreted to confer an individual
right that encompasses “all instruments that constitute bearable
arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.”12
The Court’s per curiam opinion in Caetano II chided the SJC
for failing to adequately account for the breadth of current
Second Amendment doctrine. The SJC had reasoned that section
131J was constitutional because stun guns “were not in common
use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,”13 were
unusual in the sense of being “a thoroughly modern invention,”14
and were not “readily adaptable to use in the military.”15 But the
Supreme Court found that these reasons were inconsistent with
Heller’s conclusion that the right to bear arms was not limited to
military arms or to weapons in existence in the 18th century.16
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion sharpened this criticism, noting
that the SJC “did not so much as mention” Heller’s language
interpreting the Second Amendment to include arms “not in
existence at the time of the founding.”17 The Court accordingly
vacated the SJC’s decision, insofar as “the explanation the
Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law contradicts
this Court’s precedent.”18
But if the SJC’s opinion in Caetano I did not adequately
engage with the Second Amendment’s breadth, the Supreme
Court’s opinion surely did not adequately engage with the
Amendment’s limitations. Heller itself explicitly stated that “the
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,” and
that “the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose.”19 The Heller majority went on to “recognize another
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582).
Caetano I, 26 N.E.3d at 693.
Id. at 693–94.
Id. at 694.
Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1028.
Id. at 1030 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582).
Id. at 1028.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
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important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms”—
namely, that “the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in
common use at the time’” of the founding.20 The Court observed
that this limitation was “fairly supported by the historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’”21 This language is clearly relevant to any
constitutional assessments of bans on newer weapons such as
stun guns.22 This language is also clearly in tension with any
suggestion that stun guns are obviously and categorically
protected by the Second Amendment. Yet the Supreme Court’s
decision in Caetano II barely mentioned these important
limitations on the right to bear arms and offered no discussion of
how to resolve the tensions inherent in its own Second
Amendment jurisprudence. As noted above, the Court did not
even clearly state that section 131J was necessarily
unconstitutional—it simply rejected the SJC’s reasoning and left
the doctrinal landscape in a state of ambiguity.
III. Resolving the Ambiguity: An Alternative Approach
So how was the SJC to resolve this ambiguity? One option
was the approach actually taken by the court in Ramirez—i.e., to
read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Caetano II to mean that an
absolute ban on civilian possession of stun guns is
unconstitutional.23
But that approach is unsatisfactory for
several reasons. First, it fails to adequately account for the fact
that the Supreme Court did not itself strike down the stun gun
ban when it was presented with the opportunity to do so.24
Second, the SJC’s approach would seem to assume that many of
the limits on the right to bear arms expressly recognized in Heller
20. Id. at 627.
21. Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49).
22. One might even say that “[i]t is hard to imagine language speaking
more directly to the point.” Cf. Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1030 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
23. See Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 815 (“But the absolute prohibition in § 131J
that bars all civilians from possessing or carrying stun guns, even in their home,
is inconsistent with the Second Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional.”).
24. See Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1028 (vacating the SJC’s judgment but not
striking down Massachusetts’ stun gun law).
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are without practical import. No tribunal should make such an
assumption in the absence of direct and unambiguous ruling to
that effect from the Supreme Court—and no such ruling was
reached in Caetano II.
A better option would have been for the SJC to avail itself of
the Supreme Court’s implicit invitation to offer an alternative
explanation for upholding section 131J against constitutional
challenge. Rather than emphasizing the fact that stun guns were
not in common use at the time of the founding, an alternative
explanation could have emphasized that stun guns are not in
common use even today—at least not compared to the kinds of
weapons that have heretofore been the subject of the Supreme
Court’s Second Amendment solicitousness.25 For example, the
majority opinion in Heller repeatedly emphasized the prevalence
of handguns in American society.26 Handguns were said to be the
“class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American
society” for self-defense, and are “the most preferred firearm in
the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and
family.”27
The majority in McDonald v. Chicago28 reiterated
these points, noting that “the American people have considered
the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”29
Statistics seem to bear out these observations: recent reports
estimate that there are in excess of 110 million handguns in
America.30 By comparison, there may be no more than
25. See id. (rejecting the SJC’s explanation that stun guns were not
constitutionally protected “because they were not in common use at the time of
the Second Amendment’s enactment.”).
26. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)
(“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense
in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”).
27. See id. at 628 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
29. Id. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629).
30. See Tom McCarthy, Lois Beckett & Jessica Glenza, America’s Passion
for Guns: Ownership and Violence by the Numbers, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2017,
2:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/02/us-gun-controlownership- violence-statistics (last visited June 20, 2018) (estimating that there
were some111 million handguns in U.S. as of 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Harry Enten, There’s a Gun for Every American.
But Less Than a Third Own Guns, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 15, 2018, 6:02 p.m.),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/15/politics/guns-dont-know-how-manyamerica/index.html (last visited June 20, 2018) (discussing surveys about gun
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approximately 200,000 stun guns owned by private citizens
nationwide.31
If the SJC had based its reconsideration of section 131J in
Ramirez on this contemporary disparity, it would have been
grounding its discussion firmly in Heller’s core areas of concern
while simultaneously avoiding the analytic pitfalls identified by
the Supreme Court in Caetano II. To wit, this sort of analysis
would have acknowledged that Heller and McDonald create
rights to bear arms that extend beyond weapons that were in
existence at the time of the founding, and which include
overwhelmingly common firearms such as modern handguns. At
the same time, the analysis would have been true to Heller’s clear
statement that prohibitions on dangerous and unusual weapons
are well-established in the constitutional tradition. Given that
handguns outnumber stun guns in America today by a ratio of at
least 550 to 1, it would be far from unreasonable to find stun guns
“unusual” in a constitutionally relevant sense.
But would this alternative analysis have withstood further
scrutiny by the Supreme Court? After all, the SJC did already
mention the numerical disparity between stun guns and firearms
in its initial opinion in Caetano I.32 However, the SJC’s discussion
on this point was extremely brief,33 and it was offered in
connection with the argument that stun guns were unusual at
the time the Second Amendment was enacted. Contemporary
rarity was not framed or presented as an independent basis for
upholding section 131J, nor was it rejected or even addressed by
the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court. And while Justice
Alito wrote separately to express the view that stun guns were
sufficiently popular by today’s standards to merit constitutional
protection, he was joined on this point by Justice Thomas alone.34
The fact that a majority of the Court declined to adopt Justice
ownership in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
31. Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1033.
32. See Caetano I, 26 N.E.3d at 693 (“In her motion to dismiss the
complaint against her, the defendant acknowledged that the ‘number of Tasers
and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of firearms.’”).
33. See Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1032 (characterizing the SJC’s discussion
on this point as “cursory”).
34. Id. at 1032–33.
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Alito’s reasoning strongly suggests that an argument rooted in
the modern scarcity of such weapons remains constitutionally
viable even after Caetano II. The SJC should have taken the
opportunity to develop such an argument in greater detail and to
offer it as a basis for upholding section 131J in Ramirez.
IV. Conclusion
Justice Alito declared in his concurring opinion in Caetano II
that “[a] State’s most basic responsibility is to keep its people
safe.”35 The state legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has sought to keep its people safe by limiting
access to dangerous weapons, including stun guns. Indeed, as
highlighted by the SJC in Ramirez, “[t]he legislature was so
concerned with the risk of [stun gun] misuse that, in 1986 it
initially barred all individuals, including law enforcement
officers, from possessing electrical weapons.”36 The Supreme
Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence has imposed
significant constraints on the ability of states to pursue such
safety measures. However, other courts should not interpret
these constraints more broadly than controlling precedent
requires, nor should courts fail to recognize that these constraints
themselves are limited in scope.
To suggest that the SJC should have upheld section 131J in
Ramirez is not to suggest that it should have been obtuse or
recalcitrant in the face of clear direction from the Supreme Court.
Quite to the contrary, this essay has argued that the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence has been replete with tensions and
ambiguities of the Supreme Court’s own creation. It is not
incumbent on the SJC or other courts to resolve these tensions by
reading some of the most important limitations on the right to
bear arms out of the Second Amendment altogether. In the
absence of significantly clearer direction from the Supreme Court
to the contrary, the SJC ought to have upheld the
constitutionality of section 131J—for such a decision would have

35.
36.

Id. at 1033.
Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 817.
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been fully consistent not only with Supreme Court precedent, but
also with principles of democratic governance and public safety.

